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Abstract The widespread adoption of smartphones dra-
matically increases the risk of attacks and the spread
of mobile malware, especially on the Android platform.
Machine learning-based solutions have been already used
as a tool to supersede signature-based anti-malware sys-
tems. However, malware authors leverage features from
malicious and legitimate samples to estimate statisti-
cal difference in-order to create adversarial examples.
Hence, to evaluate the vulnerability of machine learning
algorithms in malware detection, we propose five differ-
ent attack scenarios to perturb malicious applications
(apps). By doing this, the classification algorithm inap-
propriately fits the discriminant function on the set of
data points, eventually yielding a higher misclassifica-
tion rate. Further, to distinguish the adversarial exam-
ples from benign samples, we propose two defense mech-
anisms to counter attacks. To validate our attacks and
solutions, we test our model on three different bench-
mark datasets. We also test our methods using various
classifier algorithms and compare them with the state-
of-the-art data poisoning method using the Jacobian
matrix. Promising results show that generated adver-
sarial samples can evade detection with a very high
probability. Additionally, evasive variants generated by
our attack models when used to harden the developed
anti-malware system improves the detection rate up to
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50% when using the Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) method.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays using the Android application is very pop-
ular on mobile platforms. Every Android application
has a Jar-like APK format and is an archive file which
contains Android manifest and Classes.dex files. Infor-
mation about the structure of the Apps holds in the
manifest file and each part is responsible for certain
actions. For instance, the requested permissions must
be accepted by the users for successful installation of
applications. The manifest file contains a list of hard-
ware components and permissions required by each ap-
plication. Furthermore, there are environment settings
in the manifest file that are useful for running appli-
cations. The compiled source code from each applica-
tion is saved as the classes.dex file. Android application
corporate machine learning (ML) algorithms to ana-
lyze the manifest information and user profiles/histories
to customize the functionality and speed up the user
demands [6,33]. Also, ML algorithms utilize an An-
droid application to detect anomalies and malware soft-
ware [31]. The aim of the malware as a malicious soft-
ware in mobile applications is to steal confidential data
and to obtain root privileges of each APK [34]. Malware
authors (i.e., adversaries) look for the length of malware
propagation cycle to launch attacks on ML-based detec-
tors [26]. To accomplish this, malware applications are
repackaged with attributes extracted from legitimate
programs to evade detection [16,23,37]. In a nutshell,
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the generated malware sample is statistically identical
to a benign sample. To do so, adversaries adopt adver-
sarial machine learning algorithms (AML) to design an
example set called poison data which is used to fool ma-
chine learning models. Adversaries adopt several AML
methods like DroidAPIMiner [4], Mystique [24], PIn-
droid [18], and DroidChameleon [32] to reduce the de-
tection rate of classification algorithms.
According to [30], the methods used by AML fo-
cus on two general axes: i) Attack Complexity: this
involves reducing the complexity to craft attacks, and
ii) Attacker’s Knowledge: this is related to knowl-
edge about architecture, training examples and algo-
rithm to gain knowledge about the detector. If an ad-
versary is aware of the architecture, training data or
features derived from applications, the attack is called
a white-box attack (see some approaches like [13]). On
the other hand, if the Adversary’s knowledge is lim-
ited, then the attack is a black-box attack (see some
approaches like [11]). Adversarial classification can be
False positive or False negative. In the former, an at-
tacker generates a negative sample to misclassify as a
positive one. On the contrary, in the latter case mal-
ware is injected with part of the benign data to by-
pass detection. Adversarial specificity can be targeted
or non-targeted.
In targeted malware detection systems, an adver-
sary can fool a classifier and predict all adversarial sam-
ples as the same class. This also maximizes the prob-
ability of a targeted adversarial class. Conversely, non-
targeted adversaries can arbitrarily target a class. To do
so, this group of adversaries conducts several targeted
attacks and takes the one with the smallest perturba-
tion from the results or minimizes the probability of the
correct class. Finally, adversarial attack frequencies can
be One-time or multiple times/iterative. If a set of poi-
son data is required to be generated in real-time, adver-
saries should choose a one-time attack; otherwise, the
attack strategy can be iterative to update the poison
data. Moreover, it requires more interactions with the
victim classifier, and it costs more computational time
to generate them. To cope with these attacks, we need
some adversarial training which injects poison data into
training data to increase robustness and detect the mal-
ware [36].
1.1 Contribution
Different questions arise about this context, such as:
How to find a way to produce poison data that will be
added to the current ML model and will be unrecog-
nized by the current anti-malware solutions? How can
we leverage machine learning to improve system secu-
rity by presenting some adversary-aware approaches?
Do we require retraining of the current ML model to de-
sign adversary-aware learning algorithms? How to prop-
erly test and validate the countermeasure solutions in
a real-world network? The purpose of this paper is to
clarify these issues. To be precise, the main contribution
of this research is proposing a white-box AML mecha-
nism against poison attacks.
To sum up, we make the following contributions:
– We propose five different attack scenarios to gener-
ate poisoned malicious apps to disguise the learned
model.
– We implement two countermeasure methods as de-
fense mechanisms that improve the detection accu-
racy of the compromised classifier.
– We evaluate attack and defense using three bench-
mark malware dataset. Additionally, we conducted
theoretical analysis by estimating space and time com-
plexity to prove the scalability of our approach.
– Furthermore, we compared the proposed attack sce-
narios against the state-of-the-art method employing
the Jacobian matrix [13]. Moreover, we conclude that
the attacks modeled by us have the net effect identi-
cal to prior research work, in terms of misclassifica-
tion rate.
1.2 Roadmap
The paper is divided and arranged as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, discusses the literature review of related works.
Section 3 details the preliminary different attack sce-
narios proposed in AML architecture and the related
components. Section 4 reports the proposed approaches
for malware detection systems, including poison attack
scenarios using AML, while Section 5 presents the de-
fensive strategy against attacks. Next, in Section 6 we
present the performance analysis of proposed methods.
In Section 7 we describe the achievement of the ex-
periment and provide some open discussion regarding
our method. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and
presents future directions of work.
2 Related Work
We divide related works into three different classes: i)
AML methods in different contexts which we present
them in Section 2.1, ii) AML in Android malware that
we exemplify them in Section 2.2, and iii) AML applies
in Android malware with static features and their pre-
sented countermeasures that we add them in Section
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2.3. Then, we describe the works that fall into each
class.
2.1 AML in general
Adversaries apply complex algorithms to generate small
perturbations on original datasets in order to increase
the probability of fooling ML algorithms. Some of the
most efficient and important methods are presented in
[36,8,35,10,21,9,20]. For the first time, authors in [36],
introduce a set called adversarial examples1 that have
directly emerged as an input to a classification model
using gradient-based optimization. This set of data is
similar to misclassified data and shows that they can
target a class without emulating any of the human-
perceptible attributes of that class. Recently, several
authors have incorporated adversarial examples for dif-
ferent realistic case studies, such as the audio adversar-
ial example reported in [8], manipulating a traffic sign
recognition system to detour autonomous vehicles [21],
and a perturbed physical objects model to evade object
detection methods [9]. Recently, Papernot et al. [28]
study the positive effect of attack distillation for neu-
ral networks (NN) and propose a defense mechanism
against adversarial perturbations.
2.2 AML in Android malware
Having applications initially requesting less permission
during installation time can defeat a machine-learning
system based on permissions. In particular, an adver-
sary may create malicious applications to have a uni-
form distribution of permissions as in a benign dataset.
Since static analysis necessarily does not extract all the
Android apps features, the training process of the de-
tection model will not be trained based on all of the
features. Therefore, in cases where malware has been
distinguished from benign by these additional features,
the proposed models do not have the ability to dis-
criminate between them. Consequently, the developed
models will yield a higher misclassification rate. Stud-
ies in [25] report the extraction of sensitive data from
devices with apps demanding zero permission during
installation. Meanwhile, the authors in [27] illustrate
that a zero permission app could be used to infer the
users location and routes traveled using an accelerator,
magnetometer, and gyroscope. Besides, the authors in
[14] present a new hypothesis which identifies adver-
sarial inputs based on classifier output. They validate
this method using statistical tests before they are even
1 In this paper, poison data is used interchangeability as
the adversarial example.
fed to the ML model as inputs. The approach is excit-
ing and moves one step further on adversarial exam-
ple appliances in ML. However, they did not present
any countermeasure to manage such malicious behav-
ior. Conversely, we introduce two re-training defense
strategies to mitigate this limitation. Moreover, in [7],
the authors present a classification system which helps
adversaries to craft misclassified inputs and easily evade
a deployed system. This attack method, which is estab-
lished during the test phase, learns to increase the at-
tackers knowledge of the system, is classified as a tar-
geted iterative attack, and helps the attacker to ma-
nipulate attack samples. This is a skillful method that
increases the attacker’s flexibility and performance. It
also injects poison examples into training data to fool
the learning algorithm and causes misclassification er-
rors. However, it was only tested on one dataset and
did not discuss countermeasure for such a white-box
attack, while our paper addresses these aspects.
2.3 AML in Android countermeasures
The authors in [11] present two new adversarial models
inspired by Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [11]
that is based on minimax two-player between the gen-
erator (adversary) and the discriminator (classifier or
system). In other words, GAN is a game which termi-
nates at a saddle point that is a minimum with respect
to the generator and a maximum with respect to the
discriminator.
In another work [13], the authors adopt adversarial
examples to construct an effective attack against mal-
ware detection models. Unlike the previous solution,
such attack directs discrete and binary input datasets,
like the DREBIN dataset, which is a targeted, iterative
white-box method. The interesting point in this method
is that it also incorporates some potential defense mech-
anisms, e.g., defensive distillation [29] and adversarial
training [21], using deep neural networks (DNNs) to
handle malware detection models. Their achievements
indicate that their countermeasures provide robustness
based on the perturbation of the distribution and re-
duce the rate of misclassified adversarial examples. The
paper is of some interest; however, our method has two
significant benefits compared with this method. First,
our method uses a different type of attack strategies
on various datasets, which enables adversaries to easily
target the discrete domains based on the form of the
distributed datasets. Second, we use GAN and retrain-
ing as defense strategies to improve detection rate.
Recently, in [17], the authors analyze white-box
and grey-box attacks to an ML-based malware detec-
tor and conduct performance evaluations in a real-world
setting. Their main goal is to investigate the vulnera-
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bilities of an ML-based malware detector and generate
some countermeasures for such type attacks. In their
attack scenario, they can bypass the real-world ML-
based malware detector only by modifying one bit in
the feature vector.
3 Preliminaries
In the following, we briefly introduce data modeling for
static malware detection methods in Section 3.1 and
ML-based detection methods in Section 3.2.
3.1 Data modeling for static malware detection
The purpose of constructing adversarial instances in
malware detection systems is to fool the classification
algorithms used by these systems and cause that sys-
tem work in the way the attacker intends. In this pa-
per, we consider the standard setting for designing a
classifier in a problem that includes discrimination be-
tween benign (B) and malware (M) samples. In this
way, we first select the learning algorithms and perfor-
mance evaluation settings. Then, we collect a dataset D
that includes n labeled examples and extract m features
for each sample. Hence we have
D = {(xi, yi) | ∀i = 1, . . . , n}, (1)
where xi is the ith sample vector of a dataset in which
each element shows the selected feature and yi is the
related label of the samples, and yi ∈ {0, 1}. Let xij
be the value of the jth feature in ith sample where
{∀j = 1, . . . ,m}. If vector xi has the jth feature then
xij = 1; else xij = 0. In this definition n is the number
of samples in dataset, and X ⊆ {0, 1}m is a feature
space with m dimension.
Furthermore, we consider binary classification algo-
rithms in which the adversary changes the malicious
dataset to prevent detection. The adversary tries to
change the malicious data set yi = 1 in each direction
by adding a non-zero value to the feature vector. For in-
stance, adversaries may add benign-related features to
the only malware samples to evade detection by classi-
fiers. Therefore, we can construct an adversarial exam-
ple x∗ from a benign sample x which is misclassified by
the classifier F and present it in equation (2):
X∗ = X + δx, s.t. F (X + δx) 6= F (X), (2)
where δx is the minimum value can used as a perturba-
tion and cause misclassification.
3.2 Machine learning based detection method
Goodfellow et al. [12] validate that practical attack in
deep neural networks is possible because these models
are locally linear. Also, they confirm that boosted trees
are even more susceptible to attack than neural net-
works. Therefore, it can be a good reason that we ap-
ply our attack scenarios on existing tree type classifiers.
Hence, in this paper, we use three classifiers: Random
Forest, Bagging, and SVM. We provide a short descrip-
tion of each of them in the following:
– Random Forest (RF). RF is a machine learning
algorithm that creates multiple decision trees and
combines the results to provide more accurate and
reliable predictions.
– Bagging. A Bagging classifier is an estimator that
combines the base classifier results on random sets
and builds an ensemble learning-based classifier. Each
classification training set is randomly generated, with
replacement.
– Support Vector Machine (SVM). Support Vec-
tor Networks are learning models with supervised
learning algorithms that inspect the data used for
classification and regression analysis.
4 Adversarial Approaches for Malware
Detection System
We define five different scenarios which are detailed in
the following subsections. Our attack scenarios are a
targeted attack. This means that the attacker generates
some misclassified samples to infect a particular device.
The main notations and symbols used in this paper are
listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Notation and symbols used in this paper.
Notations Description
X Input data (unmodified data), x ∈ {0, 1}m, | X |= n
Y Label of class in the classification problem, y ∈ {0, 1}m
X∗ Adversarial example (modified input data)
Y ∗ Label of adversarial class in target adversarial example
M Number of features, a ∈M , |M |= m
f ML model, f : X → Y
θ Parameters of ML model f
λ Percentage of features
4.1 Attack strategy and scenarios
The attack strategy defines how the attacker compro-
mises the system, based on the hypothesized goal, knowl-
edge, and capabilities. In this paper, we characterize the
attacker’s knowledge in terms of a set S that encodes
knowledge of the data X, the feature set M and the
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classification function f . Furthermore, we assume the
attacker has complete knowledge of the target system,
and formally represent the model as V ∗ = (X;M ; f) ∈
S. We assume that the initial set of input data (i.e., or
samples) X is given. The attack strategy is to modify
the data samples using a modification function Ω(X).
Assume that the attacker’s knowledge x∗, we de-
fine a set of manipulated attacks as X∗ ∈ Ω(X) ⊆ Z,
then, we can define the attacker’s goal as an objective
function W (X∗, V ∗) ∈ R which evaluates the extent to
which the manipulated attacks X∗ meet the attacker’s
goal. Hence, we can define the optimal attack strategy
as:
OPT (X∗) = arg maxX∗∈Ω(X) W (X
∗, V ∗). (3)
To this end, we summarize each attack scenario as
follows:
Scenario 1: The attacker randomly manipulates the
features of the malware applications without having
knowledge of which feature is prominent; we call this
a trivial attack.
Scenario 2: The attacker manipulates the malware in-
stances in training set by altering features statistically
relevant in the legitimate application distribution; we
call this a Distribution attack.
Scenario 3: The attacker computes the similarity of
the malicious sample with the distribution of benign
samples and tries to modify those samples which are
closest to the k (e.g., k = 10) nearest benign samples;
we called this KNN based attack.
Scenario 4: The attacker manipulates the feature vec-
tor corresponding to each sample using the logistic re-
gression function (LR) that fits the data points. We
select those data points which are close to the benign
feature vector. Such well-crafted attacks are referred to
us as Logistic Regression attack or LR.
Scenario 5: The attacker manipulates the malware in-
stances by adopting the LR function and bio-inspired
solution to find a global solution. In this scenario, we
adopt ant colony optimization (ACO) as a sample of the
bio-inspired method to produce poison malware sam-
ples found close to goodware. We name this attack as
ACO attack.
We repeat each algorithm ten times and select the
average values for each parameter. For all these scenar-
ios, we divide the training and test datasets based on
the class parameters into Malware and Benign datasets.
Subsequently, we apply feature ranking on benign ex-
amples and select 10% of the top-ranked features. The
ranking reflects those attributes which can classify an
unseen sample to benign class with high probability.
Furthermore, we choose some percentages of the se-
lected features among the selected malware samples and
Algorithm 1 Scenarios 1-4: Trivial, Distribution, KNN,
and Logistic Regression attacks.
Input: x, y, λ
Output: x∗, y∗
Scenario 1: Trivial Attack.
1: Randomly select λ features from X
Scenario 2: Distribution Attack.
2: Randomly select ranked(λ) features from Xb
Scenario 3: KNN Attack.
3: Ranked(λ) features from Xb
4: Xs ← Randomly select 10% of samples from Xm
5: for ∀x ∈ Xs do
6: x← Find KNN of samples from Xb
7: end for
Scenario 4: Logistic Regression Attack.
8: discriminator ←Randomly select λ features from Xb us-
ing LR
9: x←select 10% of Xm near discriminator
Common parts for Scenario 1-4.
10: for each attribute a ∈ λ in x do
11: if (x[a] = 0) then
12: x[a]← 1
13: x∗ ← x
14: if (F (x∗) = y∗) then
15: break
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: return x∗, y∗
modify the feature values. Formally speaking, we select
the feature with zero value which has not been selected
before and changes zero to one. At this stage, we add
such modified malware samples to the test dataset and
classify the dataset using classification methods.
4.2 Trivial attack
In Alg. 1, focusing on line 1 and 9-18, the list variable
λ explains the features applied. To be precise, first, we
select three features from the list variables and modify
them; then, we repeat this process on all of the mem-
bers in the feature list λ. In the loop, for each selected
sample, we check the selected feature a in the λ set and
change the zero values of the feature to one and save
that sample in x∗ (line 8-10 of Alg. 1). Then, it is impor-
tant to check the modified sample and understand if it
changes to a benign sample or not. We use F (x∗) = y∗
to check this condition. If it is satisfied, we can call x∗
as an adversarial sample (i.e., poison sample) which is
the output of Alg. 1.
4.3 Distribution attack
In this scenario, we randomly manipulate the selected
ranked features of malware samples placed in the mal-
ware dataset (see line 2 and loop lines 9-18 of Alg. 1).
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After the modifications, we feed the modified malware
with the benign sample of the test dataset to the learn-
ing model and update the learning parameters.
4.4 KNN based attack
In this scenario, we first rank the λ features of the sam-
ples in the benign dataset. Second, we randomly select
10% of the malware data (samples). We calculate the
Manhattan distance of each selected sample with be-
nign files. Moreover, we select the K (in this paper, we
consider k = 10) nearest benign vectors to the corre-
sponding sample the λ highest ranked features. Indeed,
we have k new poison samples for each malware sample.
We should recall that the ranking is used to understand
the highest features in the benign samples. Then, we
add these poison samples with benign data from x to
the learning model (see line 3-7 and loop lines 9-18 of
Alg. 1).
4.5 Logistic regression attack
In this scenario, we apply an LR algorithm on the train-
ing dataset, and the result of this algorithm will be the
discriminator. The nearest malware samples to this dis-
criminator are the best choices for the modifications.
Therefore, we select 10% of the malware samples in the
training dataset which are near to the discriminator.
After that, we compare the selected malware (selected
based on 10% of the malware samples in the training
dataset) with the malware samples in the test dataset
and add ten malware samples to the test dataset for
each malware sample in the training dataset. In this
step, for 10% of the training dataset, we select the
samples with all zero features and apply logical ‘OR’
with randomly selected malware samples in the same
dataset. The resulting sample will be poison data which
can be used for the classification (see line 8-7 and loop
lines 9-18 of Alg. 1).
4.6 Ant colony based attack
In this scenario, new adversarial samples are gener-
ated using an ant colony optimization (ACO) algorithm
(see line 1 of Alg. 2). First, we apply a linear regres-
sion algorithm to select the malware samples which
are most similar to the benign samples in the training
dataset (i.e., 10% of the malware samples in the training
dataset). Formally speaking, we find the nearest mal-
ware to the discriminator in the training dataset (i.e.,
we search only in the 10% of the malware samples in the
Algorithm 2 ACO scenario
Input: X, Y , λ, ACOthreshold
Output: X∗, Y ∗
1: discriminator ←Randomly select λ features from Xb us-
ing LR
2: Xs ←select 10% of Xm near discriminator
3: for each x ∈ Xs do
4: x∗ ← ACOFunction(x)
5: if (distance(x∗, discriminator) ≤ ACOthreshold)
then
6: if (F (x∗) = y∗) then
7: X∗ ← X∗ ∪ x∗
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: return X∗, Y ∗
training dataset) (see line 5 of Alg. 2). In Alg. 2, the
function ACOFunction is used to find the adversary
sample data. In this way, the ACO pheromone value is
the number of the feature that is going to be changed.
First, we start the ACO with one feature, and we gen-
erate new samples by modifying the malware samples
with the absence of attributes which are present in le-
gitimate applications. We repeat this action by using
more features. If the distance between the newly gener-
ated sample and the discriminator is within the range
of the selected malware and the discriminator, then we
add this newly generated sample to the recently gen-
erated samples; otherwise, we discard this sample and
change the feature and re-calculate the distances. We
continue this process until the maximum iteration is
reached or the classifier misclassifies malware samples.
The algorithm of the ACO scenario attack is described
in Alg. 2.
5 Defensive Strategies Against Attacks
In this section, we discuss two countermeasures as the
main solution for the raised attacks.
5.1 Adversarial training
In the first defense method, we re-train the classification
algorithm [21]. The main difference between the new re-
trained classification dataset and the current version is
that we add the poison data with the training dataset.
Figure 1 presents the structure of the adversarial train-
ing countermeasure. In Fig. 1, the left-side boxes illus-
trate the training set which is used as a training model
and the lower-side boxes are used as a testing phase
for the learning model. The presented model uses dif-
ferent classification algorithms such as SVM, Bagging,
and Random Forest in this paper.
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Fig. 1: Adversarial training model.
Algorithm 3 Adversarial training: pseudo-Code of the re-
training defense
Input: X, Y , X∗, Y ∗
Output: Modelnew
1: Xtrn, Ytrn ← Randomly select 60% data from X and Y
2: X∗trn, Y ∗trn ← Randomly select 60% data from X∗ and
Y ∗
3: Xtrn ← Xtrn ∪X∗trn
4: Ytrn ← Ytrn ∪ Y ∗trn
5: Modelnew = RandomForestClassifier(Xtrn, Ytrn)
6: return Modelnew
We present the steps of retraining method in the
Alg. 3. The input of this algorithm is the dataset, and
corresponding labels of adversarial examples (i.e., poi-
son data) and the original dataset, and the output will
be the new retrained model using the Random For-
est classifier [15]. First, we randomly select 60% of the
dataset and corresponding labels and save them in the
training subset for the original and poison data (See
lines 1 and 2 of Alg. 3). Then, we build the new train-
ing data as presented in lines 3 and 4 of Alg. 3. Next, we
feed the adversarial model using such new trained data
with the help of the RandomForest Classifier and re-
train the model. The new model is used to implement
data classification. It is rational that the new model
which is produced by the poison data and the prelimi-
nary dataset has higher precision in data classification
compared to the existing model.
5.2 Generative adversarial network (GAN)
In the second defense method, which is called genera-
tive adversarial network (GAN), we exploit the Ran-
dom Forest Regression to select 10% of malware sam-
ples that have the greatest similarity to the benign sam-
ples in the training dataset and generate a less likely
malware set. We use the GAN as a synthetic data gener-
ator set. The GAN has two functions called Generator
and Discriminator. The generator function is used to
modify the less likely malware samples. To do so, one
Algorithm 4 GAN: pseudo-code of the GAN defense
Input: X, Y , X∗, Y ∗, λ
Output: Modelnew
1: Modelpoison ← Fit a model on Xtrn using LR
2: Lesslikely ← Fit 10% model of Xm with KNN to
Modelpoison
3: for each x ∈ Lesslikely do
4: xnew ← x
5: while xnew ∈Modelpoison Classify as M do
6: xnew ← Add ranked(λ) features from Xb ∪ xnew
7: end while
8: syntheticdata ← syntheticdata ∪ xnew
9: end for
10: Modelnew ← Fit Model on Xtrn ∪ syntheticdata
11: return Modelnew
random feature from the highest ranked features with
zero value in the training dataset is selected and its
value is changed to one and generates a new sample.
The new sample is fed to the second function, the dis-
criminator – which works like a classifier – to predict
the class variable. The discriminator module modifies
the features until the discriminator function is cheated
and labels such a sample among the benign samples.
Further, we gather the wrongly estimated malware sam-
ples into a synthetic data generator set. Besides, we use
80% of the synthetic data generator set with the train-
ing dataset to update the adversarial learning model.
We use the remaining synthetic data generator samples
(i.e., 20% of the data samples) with the test dataset to
analyze the classification. Figure 2 presents the GAN
defense architecture. 2
Fig. 2: GAN defense architecture.
2 GAN is also can be used to generate adversarial example
and fool the classifier which is out of the scope of this paper.
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It uses a generative adversarial network (GAN) for
building new samples. The GAN applies two neural net-
works which use the back-propagation technique. One
network generates candidates (called generative), and
the other evaluates them (called discriminator). In the
GAN, the training process is applied in the generative
function in such a way as to increase the error rate
of the discriminator function. The GAN structure is a
competitive setting, i.e., versus the discriminator func-
tion and simplified Turing learning [22].
Alg. 4 clearly explains the steps of the GAN-wise
countermeasure. In detail, we give the samples as an
input set to the generator function. We modified these
samples using the important features of benign sam-
ples to fool the discriminator function by producing
novel synthesized instances that appear to have come
from the benign dataset. In other words, the discrimi-
nator functions task is to discover the benign samples
from the malware ones. If the discriminator function
correctly recognizes a malware sample, that sample re-
turns to the generator function to re-train the sample.
In this algorithm, we first generate a poison model,
called Model˙poison, using the logistic regression algo-
rithm (see line 1). Then, in line 2 of Alg. 4, we build
10% samples of the malware dataset which are KNN
nearest to the established poison model and save these
samples in Lesslikely set. Indeed, Lesslikely set is com-
posed of samples that have the greatest similarity to
the malware dataset. For each sample in Lesslikely, if it
belongs to the poison model we label it as ‘M’ for Mal-
ware, then we try to modify it with the most important
features in the benign dataset until it falls out from the
malware dataset and is classified as part of the benign
dataset (see the lines 5-7 of Alg. 4).
Hence, if a sample in GAN is recognized as a benign
sample, we add it to the synthetic data set. After ana-
lyzing all the samples, we use 80% of the synthetic data
samples set with the training dataset (malware and be-
nign) to generate the new model and feed it to the clas-
sification algorithms. The remaining samples are in the
synthetic data with a test dataset for analyzing the new
model. In a nutshell, we will see that the new model im-
proves the level of accuracy.
5.3 Time/Space complexity of the attack and defense
algorithms
In the following section, we conduct time and space
complexity analysis on the presented attacks and de-
fenses.
5.3.1 Time complexity
Focusing on the time complexity of Alg. 1, we consider
four attack scenarios which have similar code interac-
tions from lines 10–19. Note that this common part
(for loop presents in lines-10–19) runs off the order of
O(λ · n) for all samples (i.e., we have a total of n sam-
ples), where λ is the selected features of our m total
number of the featured applied per sample in this paper.
Also, we know that in malware dataset λ < m << n.
So, we can list the time complexity of each attack sce-
nario as follows:
– Trivial attack. In this scenario, we select λ features
from a total of m features in the original dataset (i.e.,
X). In the worse case, it runs off the order of O(λ ·n)
for all samples. As a result, the overall complexity of
a trivial attack is about O(m · n).
– Distribution attack. In this scenario, we put the
feature in descending order and select the λ highest
ranked features. Hence, in the worse case, it runs
off the order of O(m2) per sample. As a result, the
overall complexity of distribution attack, considering
the common block of the Alg. 1, is about O(m2 · n).
– KNN based attack. In this scenario, we first se-
lect λ features of the ordered vector of m features
(the time takes is of the order of O(m2)). Second,
we randomly select 10% of the malware samples (the
time takes is of the order of O(n)). Finally, we select
the K sample, so the time taken for selecting is of
the order of O(k ·λ ·n) [2], where we use k as a fixed
value in this scenario. As a result, the overall time
complexity of the KNN attack is about O(k · λ · n).
– LR based attack. In this scenario, we randomly
select λ important features from the benign dataset
using the LR algorithm and select 10% samples of
the malware dataset which are near to the legitimate
samples, which takes of the order of O(n). Consider-
ing the common block of Alg. 1, the overall time is
taken for the LR attack is about O(λ · n).
– ACO attack. In this scenario which is detailed in
Alg. 2, we first build a discriminator and select 10%
of the malware samples near the discriminator, which
takes of the order of O(n). The main for loop n times
run the ACO algorithm. Therefore, the overall time
taken for the ACO attack is about O(n4)).
We present two defense mechanisms in this paper.
In each method, we try to modify the current model
and build an updated model that has more intelligence
against the attacks mounted. In the following, we de-
scribe the time it takes to build the new retrained model:
– Adversarial training defense. In this method, which
is detailed in Alg. 3, we first randomly select 60% of
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original and poison data and build new training set
which runs for around O(n). Then, we gather the
trained and poison data which run for around O(n).
Then, we run the Random Forest regression func-
tion on these two datasets and build a new model.
The Random Forest regression function utilizes a de-
cision tree for classifying the data and identifies the
important features based on the results of the clas-
sification. Since we have n samples and m features,
the time taken to establish each tree is about O(m ·
n · logn). As a result, the overall time taken for the
adversarial training defense method is in the order of
O(m · n · logn).
– GAN defense. According to Alg. 4, building the
poison model takes in the order of O(n). Then, we
use the KNN method to make a Lesslikely matrix
which takes for about O(m · n). The loop runs for
each sample out of Lesslikely matrix and for each of
them while the instruction is checked on the poison
model (see lines 5-7). Hence, the duration of the for
loop runs for about O(n2). As a result, the overall
time taken for the GAN defense method is in the
order of O(n2).
5.3.2 Space Complexity
Focusing on the space complexity of Alg. 1, for the Triv-
ial attack, we need a vector space to select λ features
among m available features, so the required space is in
the order of O(λ ·n) for all samples. Regarding the Dis-
tribution attack, we also need to select lambda features
out of m features, so the overall space complexity of
this scenario runs of the order of O(λ · n) for all sam-
ples. Regarding the KNN based attack, first, we rank
the features, which is applied as in-place ordering that
runs of the order of O(λ · n) for all samples. Then, we
need a space to save 10% of the malware dataset, which
runs off the order of O(m ·n). Finally, the overall space
complexity required for this scenario runs of the or-
der of O(m · n). Regarding the LR attack, LR takes at
most a dataset space to randomly select λ features in
the benign dataset and occupy O(m · n) space to find
10% of nearest malware dataset to the discriminator.
As a result, the overall space complexity of the LR sce-
nario is in order of O(m · n). Focusing on the space
complexity of Alg. 2, we first select λ features out of
m features for each sample, so we need a space of the
order of O(m · n) for this. Then, we need to consider
the order of O(m ·n) for the required space to find 10%
of the nearest malware dataset to the discriminator. In
the for loop, we build the dataset at most n times. As
a result, the overall space complexity of the ACO sce-
nario is in the order of O(m ·n2). Focusing on the space
complexity of Alg. 3 for adversarial training defense,
similar to the previous algorithms, the space required
for running the lines 1-4 runs for around O(n ·m). Also,
the space required to generate RandomForestClassifier
function is in the order of O(NT · n · m) [3], where
NT is the number of trees we need to consider to run
this function. As a result, the overall space complex-
ity takes about O(NT · n ·m). Focusing on the space
complexity of Alg. 4 for GAN defense, similar to the
previous algorithms, the space required for the Logis-
ticRegression function and Lesslikely matrix is in the
order of O(n ·m). All the classification algorithms us-
ing the Lesslikely dataset can consume space in order
of O(n ·m). As a result, the overall space complexity is
in the order of O(n ·m).
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we report an experimental evaluation of
the proposed attack algorithms and their countermea-
sures by testing them under different scenarios.
6.1 Simulation setup
In the following, we present the classifiers, datasets,
training/testing structure, test metrics, and hyper- pa-
rameter tuning.
Classifiers. We use three classifiers as described in
Section 3.2, in which we set the k-fold variable to 10.
As explained previously, the random forest (RF) algo-
rithm classifies the data by constructing multiple deci-
sion trees. In this paper, the number of decision trees
used is 100. In RF, the maximum number of features
used to find the best split of the features is set to 3. In
the Bagging algorithm, we use the DecisionTreeClassi-
fier as the base estimator. The number of decision trees
used is 100. We average our results over 10 independent
runs for each classifier.
Datasets: We conducted our experiments using three
datasets, as detailed below:
– Drebin dataset: The Drebin dataset [5] is a set of An-
droid samples that we can straightforwardly apply in
a lightweight static analysis. For each Android ap-
plication, we perform a linear sweep over the app’s
content and obtain the manifest and the disassem-
bled dex code. We then extensively analyze all the
extracted features, which are represented as a set
of binary strings. These features are classified into
permissions, intents and API calls. The samples con-
tain 131,611 applications over about two years (2010-
2012) containing both benign and malware/malicious
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software. The Drebin dataset contains 96,150 appli-
cations from the GooglePlay store, 19,545 applica-
tions from the Chinese market, 2,810 applications
from the Russian market and 13,106 samples from
other sources such as Android websites, malware fo-
rums, and security blogs.
– Genome dataset: In Genome project which was sup-
ported by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) [19],
the authors gather about 1,200 Android malware sam-
ples from various categories from August 2010 to Oc-
tober 2011. They categorize them based on their in-
stallation methods, activation mechanisms, and their
malicious payloads.
– Contagio dataset: Contagio mobile dataset presents
a list of uploaded dropbox samples that are gathered
from various mobile applications. It includes 16,800
benign and 11,960 malicious samples of mobile apps
in 2015 [1].
Mobile application static features. The datasets
we tested have several syntax features. The malicious
applications gathered have various permissions, intents
and API calls, and we assume that malicious applica-
tions are distinguishable from benign ones. We summa-
rize the different application syntax features as follows:
– Permission: Each application (APK) of an Android
file has an essential profile that includes information
about the application, known as permission. The An-
droid OS needs to process these permission files be-
fore installation. This profile file indicates the per-
mission types for each application when interacting
with an Android OS or other applications.
– API: This feature can monitor various calls to APIs
in the Android OS, e.g., sending an SMS, or accessing
a user’s location or device ID. The Android OS pro-
vides an API framework that helps the applications
to interact with the OS easily.
– Intent: This type of feature is used to represent com-
munication between different components. It is also
called a medium, as it can serve as a communication
link between the asynchronous data exchange infor-
mation and the calls to various applications.
In order to find the optimal number of features for mod-
ification in each attack, we repeat our experiments for
λ={1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 20%}
of the manifest features (i.e., M).
Parameter setting. We run each attack and defense
algorithm 10 times and report the average results. At
each repetition, we randomly consider 60% of the dataset
as training samples, 20% as validation samples and 20%
as testing samples. This enables us to evaluate the de-
gree to which a classifier can maintain its detection of
malware from different sources. We set the maximum it-
eration of the ACO attack algorithm to 1000. Besides,
we modify 300 variables corresponding to the ranked
feature vector using the ACO algorithm for each it-
eration. We fix the evaporation ratio to 0.1 and the
pheromones rate per path that is corresponding to the
coefficient of experience and collective knowledge to
0.99. All of the experiments (four attacks and two de-
fenses using three datasets with three classification al-
gorithms) were run on an eight-core Intel Core i7 with
speed 4 GHz, 16 GB RAM, OS Win10 64-bit using
Python 3.6.4. Also, we keep the source code of the pa-
per in 3.
Feature selection. Due to a large number of features,
we first ranked the features using the RandomForestRe-
gressor algorithm. We then selected 300 of these fea-
tures with higher ranks.
Comparison of solutions. We compare our defense
algorithms with the Jacobian saliency map used to craft
malware samples in [13], called JSMA. The Jacobian-
matrix-based algorithm is used to craft adversarial ex-
amples, since the binary indicator vector used by these
authors to represent an application does not possess any
particular structural properties or inter-dependencies.
Hence, they apply a regular, feed-forward neural net-
work with an architecture consisting of two hidden lay-
ers, each involving 200 neurons. In [13], the authors
consider at most 20 feature modifications to any of
the malware applications. Our solution uses a SoftMax
function for normalization of the output probabilities
in the malware detection system, as follows:
Fi(X) =
exi
ex0 + ex1
, xi =
mn∑
j=1
wj,i · xj + bj,i, (4)
where F is the gradient function, x is the input sample,
and mn is the number of features. The above authors
follow two steps when building adversarial examples. In
the first step, they calculate the F gradient according to
X to estimate the direction in which the perturbation
in X can calculate the output of function F (see (5)):
JF =
∂F (X)
∂X
=
[
∂Fi(X)
∂Xj
]
i∈{0,1},j∈[1,m]
, (5)
In the second step, a perturbation δ for X with a max-
imum positive gradient is selected in the target class
Y ′. For presenting the attack mechanism, the index i
changes the target class to 0 by changing Xi, as de-
scribed in (6):
i = arg maxj∈[1,m],Xj=0F0(Xj), (6)
3 https://github.com/mshojafar/sourcecodes/blob/
master/Taheri2019APIN-AdverserialML_Sourcecode.zip
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This process continues until one of the two following
conditions is fulfilled: (i) the maximum number of changes
allowed is reached, or (ii) a misclassification is success-
fully caused.
Test metrics. We use certain metrics to evaluate the
results, which are listed as follows:
– True Positive (TP): Denote malware correctly clas-
sified as malware.
– True Negative (TN): is the number of legitimate ap-
plications precisely identified by the classification al-
gorithm.
– False Positive (FP): denote the number of misclassi-
fied benign applications.
– False Negative (FN): is the count of malware files
misclassified as goodware.
– Accuracy: This is the ratio between the number of
correct predictions and the total number of input
samples. A higher value of accuracy indicates that
the algorithm is able to correctly identify the label
of the samples with a higher probability. Thus, we
have
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (7)
– Precision: This is the fraction of relevant instances
among the retrieved instances. Hence we have:
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
, (8)
– Recall: This is the fraction of retrieved instances over
the total amount of relevant instances. Both precision
and recall are therefore based on an understanding
and measure of relevance. This can be written as:
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, (9)
– False Positive Rate (FPR): This is defined as the
ratio between the number of negative events incor-
rectly classified as positive (false positive) and the
true number of negative events (false positive + true
negative). Therefore we have
FPR =
FP
TP + TN
, (10)
– Area Under Curve (AUC): This defines a metric for
determining the best class prediction model using all
possible thresholds. Thus, AUC measures the trade-
off between (1-FPR) and FPR. The intrinsic goal of
AUC is to solve the situation in which a dataset con-
sists of unbalanced samples (or a skewed sample dis-
tribution), and it is necessary that the model is not
overfitted to the class consisting of a higher number
of instances. This can be written as:
AUC =
1
2
(
TP
TP + FP
+
TN
TN + FP
)
. (11)
6.2 Experimental results
In this section, we apply the above attacks to our orig-
inally trained classifiers to examine the impact of GAN
and adversarial training as defensive mechanisms against
adversarial examples in the domain of malware detec-
tion.
6.2.1 Evaluation of different features
In the first results, we present the machine learning
metrics for our attack scenarios and defense algorithms
versus the JSMA attack method [13] for different num-
bers of selected features. We present three sets of plots.
In the first group, we compare the FPR metric de-
scribed in Section 6.1 for various attack algorithms; in
the second group, we compare the aforementioned FPR
ratio for the defense algorithms; and in the last group,
we validate the AUC metric for the defense and attack
algorithms to indicate the success of the proposed at-
tacks and defenses.
Comparison of attack algorithms: In the following fig-
ures, we compare the FPR values for our attack algo-
rithms and the JSMA attack algorithm, using the API
and permission data from the Drebin, Contagio and
Genome datasets. As we can see, the three sets of com-
parison plots (Figs. 3a-3c, Figs. 3d-3f, and Figs. 3g-3i)
show that for the API and intent type files, the LR
attack performs much better than the other algorithms
(i.e., for each of the four selected samples, the LR attack
can modify the features of one of them in such a way to
fool the classifier). This effect can be explained by con-
sidering that performing predictive analysis on promi-
nent features avoids overfitting in the poison learning
model, which leads to a greater FPR. For permission
type apps, the FPR value fluctuates and depends on the
features selected. Hence, the FPR values for all attacks
do not change smoothly. This value is always higher for
the LR, Distribution and KNN attack algorithms than
for the JSMA method [13].
Comparison of AUC for different datasets
Comparison of the defense algorithms: To fully evalu-
ate our defense algorithms, we test the FPR rate for the
various number of feature and file types using various
datasets, as shown in Fig. 4. The following figures show
the adversarial training and GAN defense algorithms.
From Fig. 4, we can elicit two main conclusions: firstly,
the performance of the GAN defense method (the latter
defense method) is better than the former defense al-
gorithm, and the differences between the FPR rates for
12 Rahim Taheri et al.
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Fig. 3: Comparison between attack algorithms in terms of FPR for various numbers of selected features using an RF classifier
for API, intent and permission data.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of defense algorithms in terms of FPR over various numbers of selected features using an RF classifier for
API, intent and permission data (AT= adversarial training).
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Fig. 5: Comparisons of the average AUC value for attack/defense algorithms on different datasets using RF classifier for API,
permission, and intent data.
GAN and the adversarial training algorithm for API
files are about 1.1%, 1%, and 0.75% for the Drebin,
Contagio and Genome datasets, respectively; and sec-
ondly, the differences in the FPR rates for the GAN de-
fense method compared with the LR algorithm for API
files (i.e. the highest FPR rate attack algorithm for API
files) for the Drebin, Contagio and Genome datasets are
about 25%, 9%, and 6%. This indicates that our GAN
defense algorithm is an efficient method for reducing
the misclassification rate of authentic programs as mal-
ware, and is comparable with other results.
In Fig. 5, we present the AUC values for the at-
tack and defense algorithms. Fig. 5a shows the AUC
values for the attack algorithms (including JSMA [13])
for the permission, API and intent data for the Drebin,
Bagging, and Gnome datasets using RF classifier. For
an attacker’s point of view, it is vital to obtain smaller
AUC values that allow adversarial samples to be gener-
ated and the learning model to be easily modified. From
this figure, we can draw three conclusions. Firstly, at-
tack algorithms perform better for permission data than
for API and intent data. This means that our attack
algorithms can manipulate the sample data to produce
adversarial samples and fool the classification algorithm
more easily. Secondly, the LR and distribution attack
algorithms have lower values for AUC for all datasets
compared with the JSMA algorithm and with respect
to the FPR values presented in Fig. 3. Hence, these two
algorithms can be selected as stronger attack methods.
Finally, our algorithms show better AUC results for the
Drebin dataset for all three file types. This means that
the average rate of AUC for all of our attack algorithms
applied to permission data from the Drebin dataset is
about 15%, which is 11% lower than for the API and in-
tent data. However, the average AUC rate for all three
file types is approximately the same for the Contagio
dataset.
A comparison between the defense algorithms pre-
sented in Figs. 5d-5f shows that it is essential to ob-
tain a significant value of AUC. Hence, from these fig-
ures, we can see that the results for the proposed de-
fense methods applied to the API data of the Con-
tagio dataset perform better than for the Drebin and
Genome datasets. In contrast, when we perform our de-
fense algorithms on the permission data, the AUC re-
sults for the Contagio dataset have smaller values com-
pared with the Drebin and Genome datasets. When we
run the defense algorithms on the intent files, the AUC
ratio for the Drebin dataset is higher than permission
and API file types for the two other datasets. Moreover,
the GAN defense method has higher AUC values than
the adversarial training defense algorithm, and the rates
are approximately the same for both file types. Hence,
GAN is an efficient solution that can be applied to all
datasets, and especially the Drebin dataset, as a de-
fense against the adversarial example produced by the
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attack algorithms. As a conclusion, we understand that
Drebin dataset can be an efficient dataset that we can
perform attack/defense algorithms on it and evaluate
our methods compared with the JSMA method [13].
6.2.2 Performance of attack/defense algorithms on the
Drebin dataset
First, we evaluate the average FPR values for all feature
lengths for the various attack algorithms, using three
types of files for the Drebin dataset and all classifiers,
as described in Section 6.2.2. We then select the much
more easily modifiable features, which can accelerate
the attack process as described in Section 6.2.2. Finally,
we evaluate the robustness of the attack and defense
strategies against the JSMA method [13] and present
the ML metrics for the selected features described in
Section 6.2.2.
Performance of FPR vs. file types vs. classifiers As an
attacker, we need to narrow the attack algorithm tar-
gets using the specific classifier and file types. We there-
fore calculate the FPR value for each file type when
manipulated with attack algorithms for various classi-
fication methods. Figure 6 demonstrates the results of
this evaluation and suggests two findings. Firstly, the
average FPR value ratio for the API and permission
files is lower than for the intent files. This drives the at-
tack algorithms to concentrate on the last group of files
(see the right-hand set of bar charts in Fig. 6). Hence,
the intent file type is much easier to modify using attack
algorithms. Secondly, most of our algorithms can pro-
duce a larger value of FPR than the JSMA method, for
all classification methods. However, the SVM classifica-
tion algorithm is the weakest classification algorithm,
and RF is the strongest.
Performance of reasonable feature selection In this study,
an attacker needs to know the minimum number of fea-
tures of each sample in order to manipulate them and
falsify the classifier. We therefore compare and evaluate
the FPR rate for different numbers of selected features.
Table 2 shows the FPR rate for each attack algorithm
for the various numbers of features chosen to run the in-
tent data in the Drebin dataset using the RF classifier.
From Table 2, we can conclude that when increasing the
number of features for testing in each scenario, the av-
erage FPR remains approximately fixed, while the time
of execution clearly increases.
Performance of ML metrics for three selected features
In the following, we evaluate the robustness of our clas-
sifiers when encountering five different attacks and two
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Fig. 6: Comparison of average FPR values for attack algo-
rithms for the Drebin dataset using different classifiers and
different file types.
defense scenarios for three selected features. Table 3
shows the results of the proposed algorithms for the in-
tent data from the Drebin dataset. As shown in this
table, we first apply classification algorithms without
an attack strategy. It is noticeable that the accuracy
of the classifiers without an attack is above 84%. The
maximum FPR value with no attack is 13.23% for the
RF classifier. Furthermore, the FPR values for the two
other classifiers are even less than 13%.
The trivial algorithm inserts random noise into sam-
ples. Hence, the accuracy value for the trivial algorithm
is approximately the same for all classification algo-
rithms and is about 72%. Conversely, the FPR value
increases, but due to the lack of targeted changes in
this method, the FPR is lower than for the other pro-
posed attacks. The distributed attack only manipulates
the features of the malware samples that are within the
distribution of benign samples in the training set. As
can be seen from Table 3, this algorithm is more suc-
cessful in reducing the accuracy than the other methods
for the Bagging classifier and reduces it by about 9%
compared to the rate before the attack. The distribu-
tion algorithm also has the lowest precision compared
to the other proposed attack scenarios and has a value
similar to the JSMA method of about 26%. Hence, this
attack offers a reasonable level of accuracy and can be
a suitable option for the Drebin dataset using the Bag-
ging classifier. The KNN attack scenario is an aggres-
sive attack since it reduces the accuracy to the low-
est value for the RF classifier compared to the other
attack algorithms. This attack selects k benign sam-
ples near to each malware sample and changes their
features. Hence, a KNN attack can obtain the highest
recall values. When using the LR attack scenario as a
discriminator, we tried to change the benign samples
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Table 2: FPR rate in (%) for each attack algorithm vs. the number of selected features for permission data in the Drebin
dataset using an RF classifier.
Number of selected features
Scenario
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 60
Trivial 27.27 27.39 26.91 27.21 27.22 27.29 27.29 27.29 27.29 27.29 27.29
Distrbut. 27.26 27.27 27.26 27.33 27.36 27.36 27.36 27.40 27.40 27.40 27.40
KNN 27.35 27.35 27.23 27.29 27.38 26.99 27.25 27.32 26.91 26.98 26.98
LR 27.36 27.36 27.31 27.34 27.41 27.43 27.45 27.43 27.43 27.43 27.43
ACO 26.86 26.86 26.89 26.86 26.86 27.04 27.04 27.04 27.08 27.08 27.08
JSMA [13] 27.23 27.24 27.23 27.19 27.26 27.28 27.28 27.30 27.30 27.29 27.30
Table 3: Accuracy, FPR, precision and recall values for intent data of the Drebin dataset (Acc= accuracy; Prs= precision;
Rec= recall; Distrbut= distribution attack; AT= adversarial training).
Classifiers
Random Forest (RF) Bagging SVM
T
y
p
e
Scenarios.
Acc. FPR Prs Rec Acc FPR Prs Rec Acc FPR Prs Rec
Norm Without 84.16 13.23 0.91 0.63 80.09 12.99 0.86 0.71 79.76 13.05 0.87 0.67
Trivial 72.60 27.27 0.31 0.17 72.05 27.12 0.27 0.16 72.70 27.49 0.31 0.16
Distrbut. 72.50 27.26 0.26 0.12 71.02 27.42 0.29 0.14 72.59 27.80 0.28 0.14
KNN 71.50 27.35 0.29 0.01 72.4 27.39 0.30 0.07 71.80 27.77 0.29 0.06
LR 72.50 27.36 0.34 0.19 71.40 27.56 0.29 0.11 71.56 27.92 0.31 0.16
A
tt
a
c
k
ACO 78.86 26.86 0.31 0.21 77.29 26.31 0.29 0.13 72.60 26.14 0.30 0.17
JSMA [13] 73.21 27.23 0.26 0.16 72.21 27.50 0.25 0.14 72.36 27.21 0.27 0.18
AT 79.10 17.53 0.68 0.35 80.11 17.45 0.71 0.39 79.07 17.16 0.69 0.43
D
fn
s
GAN 80.93 14.36 0.82 0.46 82.54 15.95 0.79 0.41 80.54 15.14 0.85 0.51
near to this discriminator by adding features from mal-
ware samples to fool the classifier. From the attackers
point of view, this algorithm is the dominant attack,
since it has the lowest value for FPR. The FPR values
obtained by applying the LR attack on the RF, Bagging
and SVM classifiers are 27.36%, 27.56%, and 27.92%,
respectively. Finally, the ACO attack scenario produces
adversarial samples using the ant colony optimization
algorithm and adds them to the dataset. The results
of the experiments show that this method is similar to
other methods in terms of the FPR value, but the ac-
curacy value does not change significantly. This means
that the level of accuracy is not reduced and the value
of the FPR is no higher than for the other attack algo-
rithms.
For the defense algorithms, we expect the accuracy
of the classification to increase and the FPR value to
decrease. From Table 3, we observe that the GAN-based
method always has higher accuracy than the adversar-
ial training method. The FPR values for the adversar-
ial training method with the RF, Bagging, and SVM
classifiers are lower than for the GAN defense method.
In Table 3, we highlight the highest FPR and lowest
accuracy values among the attack algorithms and the
lowest FPR and highest accuracy among the defense al-
gorithms; these correspond to the best attack and best
defense algorithms.
6.2.3 Evaluation of detection time
In this section, the execution times for the attack al-
gorithms and the defense solutions are compared. Ta-
ble 4 compares the time required for training, testing,
poisoning and defense for the different proposed algo-
rithms. As can be seen from the proposed algorithms,
the trivial attack is the fastest attack method, since it
randomly selects and modifies the features. The ACO
attack algorithm is the slowest attack algorithm to gen-
erate adversarial samples. The KNN attack algorithm
requires the calculation of the distance between the ad-
jacent samples, and takes much more time than the
other attack methods. In terms of the classification al-
gorithms, the RF algorithm time consumption for the
training and testing phases is lower than for the Bag-
ging and SVM algorithms. By comparing the proposed
algorithms with the JSMA method, we find that the
execution time for the proposed methods is better in
most cases than for the JSMA algorithm. In terms of
the time taken by the attack algorithm on the permis-
sion, API and intent data types, it is easy to see that
the time required for API data files is larger than for
the two other files types, and this rate is lower for the
RF classification algorithm.
Both of the proposed defense algorithms need a cer-
tain amount of time to apply the defense mechanism in
the poisoned dataset, which we call the defense period,
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and this is presented in the same cell as the poisoning
time for each classification algorithm. According to the
last six rows of Table 4, the defense time for the adver-
sarial training algorithm is about half of the time taken
by the GAN defense learning model against adversarial
example injections. However, the duration of the train-
ing and testing phases for both defense algorithms are
comparable. It is also clear that API apps require more
time than other file types for both defense algorithms.
Overall, the SVM classifier requires more time than RF
for all three phases (i.e., training, testing, and defense).
Table 4 confirms that GAN is the best defense algo-
rithm; among the classification algorithms, RF is the
most efficient classifier and requires less time than the
other classification algorithms.
7 Discussion and Limitations
The primary goal of crafting adversarial samples is to
evaluate the robustness of Machine Learning based mal-
ware classifier for identifying malware camouflaged as
legitimate samples. In order to ascertain the aforesaid
conjecture, we developed malicious samples statistically
identical to benign applications by implementing dif-
ferent poisoning methods. In each attack scenario, the
functionality of malicious samples was preserved. How-
ever structural changes at the Android component level
was carried out. To be precise, we considered two re-
strictions which assure app functionality. Firstly, we
modify the manifest features that are related to the
AndroidManifest.xml file in any Android app. Secondly,
we change the features that are added to the real ap-
plication. These features are written using a single line
of code. Comprehensive experiments carried in this pa-
per clearly depict that malware samples can be shifted
to a benign class by altering permission and intents.
In the majority of cases, we observed that there was
an increase in FPR between 26.5%-28.5%. Further, we
also conclude that the transformation of a malicious
app’s to trusted ones could be undertaken with ad-
ditional efforts, requiring augmentation of large code
blocks as compared to attributes like permission and in-
tents. We observed that retraining with adversarial ex-
amples with corrected labels and GAN generated sam-
ples the trained model can appropriately identify sam-
ples drawn from the unseen distribution. One of the
main limitations of the proposed method is the detec-
tion of malicious samples launching an attack on execu-
tion time. This can be addressed by creating a system
call flow graph and focusing on critical path depict-
ing frequent operations. Subsequently, feeding the ma-
chine learning classifier with the statistics of a sequence
of frequent operations. Alternatively, apps, if analyzed
independently, may appear legitimate but when they
collude shows malicious behavior. Detection of samples
exhibiting such behavior is beyond the scope of this
work. However, such apps can be detected by estimat-
ing flow by representing the information flow using fi-
nite state with the output. This way of representing
an application state can exhibit fine-grained informa-
tion flow from multiple states to the subset of states or
specific states of given automata. Additionally, we can
infer the current state and next state information on an
event to discover the vulnerable source and sink pairs.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we propose five different attack algo-
rithms: a trivial algorithm, a benign distribution, KNN,
LR, and a bio-inspired method based on the ant colony
algorithm. We compare these algorithms with the most
recent static approach based on a Jacobian method,
called JSMA, in terms of providing adversarial exam-
ples based on Android mobile data to fool classification
algorithms. We also propose two defense algorithms
based on adversarial training and GAN architecture.
We validate our attack and defense algorithms using
three public datasets, namely the Drebin, Genome, and
Contagio datasets, using API, intent and permission file
types. We test our models before and after implement-
ing attacks on three classification algorithms: the RF,
SVM and Bagging algorithms. It is observed that us-
ing 300 ranked syntax features of these Android mobile
datasets, the benign distribution and LR attack algo-
rithms could fool the classification algorithms using the
Drebin dataset. This was particularly true for RF, with
an FPR of more than 27%, an accuracy of less than 72%
and an AUC of up to 50%. These achievements are in-
teresting as they are higher than the JSMA approach
by about 5% for AUC, 5% for FPR, and 5% for accu-
racy. The GAN approach can also decrease the FPR
value by about 10%, increase the precision by about
50%, and increase the accuracy by up to 25%, and can
be used as an efficient solution for such attacks.
For the future development of our work, we may fur-
ther improve the level of per feature robustness against
various adversarial manipulations. To do so, we need to
add the knowledge of feature robustness to the learn-
ing model to make it difficult for the attacker to identify
the feature characteristics which are more complicated
to manipulate.
Can Machine Learning Model with Static Features be Fooled: an Adversarial Machine Learning Approach 17
Table 4: Execution time in seconds (s) for training, testing and application/refining of the poisoning phases on attack/defense
algorithms for all file types, datasets and classifications (TRN=training phase; TES=test phase; POS=poisoning phase; AT=
adversarial training; DFT= defense time).
Drebin Dataset Classifiers
Time (s) RF Bagging SVM
Scenario File Type TRN TES POS TRN TES POS TRN TES POS
Permission 3.32 1.48 0.03 2.85 3.50 0.02 3.50 3.56 0.03
API 3.95 2.76 0.22 2.43 3.62 0.28 3.73 4.34 0.218Trivial
Intents 3.09 1.97 0.02 0.59 4.09 0.15 2.5 3.85 0.96
Permission 3.56 1.72 0.10 4.48 4.78 0.18 3.40 3.86 0.109
API 3.38 3.21 0.36 2.09 3.43 0.37 3.84 3.05 0.296Distrbut.
Intents 2.82 1.91 0.06 0.57 3.84 0.062 2.42 2.9 0.093
Permission 3.51 1.23 1.92 4.20 5.51 2.89 3.82 3.2 1.59
API 3.91 3.22 2.75 2.93 4.79 2.00 3.48 3.84 1.89KNN
Intents 2.98 1.52 1.86 0.53 4.21 1.50 2.46 3.81 1.48
Permission 3.44 2.01 0.13 4.54 5.09 0.26 3.70 3.73 0.01A
tt
a
c
k
s
API 3.65 2.73 0.90 3.67 4.55 0.93 3.86 3.43 0.1LR
Intents 2.70 1.27 0.11 0.68 4.52 0.06 3.69 3.82 0.113
Permission 4.00 1.96 146.13 4.21 3.04 125.6 3.56 3.53 161.24
API 2.98 3.97 151.76 3.21 4.89 139.13 3.72 3.92 109.6ACO
Intents 2.79 1.70 143.62 0.62 4.62 99.94 3.61 3.26 176.1
Permission 3.70 1.84 0.145 4.34 5.34 0.21 3.98 3.29 0.23
API 3.44 2.81 0.84 3.79 3.74 0.97 3.76 4.16 1.06JSMA [13]
Intents 2.65 2.34 0.07 0.57 3.89 0.62 2.52 3.29 0.01
Scenario File Type TRN TES DFT TRN TES DFT TRN TES DFT
Permission 3.61 1.83 6.99 3.29 1.71 5.51 3.43 3.72 8.20
API 3.18 3.09 7.75 3.67 3.29 7.64 3.81 3.35 7.44AT
Intents 2.32 1.89 3.43 2.98 1.94 3.75 2.94 3.03 3.95
Permission 3.39 1.61 10.48 3.24 1.83 9.78 3.73 3.27 9.86
API 3.97 3.27 11.24 3.12 2.91 12.43 3.68 3.66 11.89
D
e
fe
n
se
s
GAN
Intents 3.05 1.43 7.78 3.24 1.28 11.4 3.03 3.86 7.90
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Appendix
In this section, we use 60 ranked (ascending priorities)
dimensional feature vectors out of 300 available features
for the study for different datasets. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we present these features for the Drebin dataset
(breakdowns are shown in Table A.5). For example, we
select and adopt 20 first features of the Drebin dataset
for 6% of selected feature rates.
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